kant famously rules out the possibility of any knowledge of God's existence or non-existence (A 590/B 618; A 742-44/B 770-72).
1 In denying the possibility of knowledge about God, Kant departs from his rationalist sources, and from his own earlier position . Leibniz, Wolff, Locke, Crusius, Meier, and Baumgarten all assert that we can have knowledge (Wissen) of the existence and properties of God.
2 Although he finds that there is an absence of evidence sufficient for knowledge about God's existence, or non-existence, this is not, for 1 With the exception of the Critique of Pure Reason, I cite Kant's texts by reference to Kants Gesammelte Schriften. These references are to volume and page number, and are prefaced by an abbreviation of the title of the work, as set out in the Bibliography. Citations to the first Critique are to the A (first edition) or B (second edition) pages. Translations, unless otherwise stated, are from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. The Reflexionen are referred to using the numbering system introduced by Erich Adickes and Friedrich Berger, and set out in volumes 15 through 19 of the Gesammelte Schriften. 2 Leibniz, Monadology, §36-45; Wolff, Vernünftige Gedanken, §361; Locke, Essay, Book IV, Chapter 10, Section 6, 621. Citations from this book are according to book, chapter, section, and page number in Peter Nidditch's edition published by Oxford; Crusius, Entwurf, Meier, Auszug, §114; Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §811. It is a free affirmation, not one for which dogmatic proofs for the theoretically determining power of judgment are to be found, nor one to which we hold ourselves to be obligated, but one which we assume for the sake of an aim in accordance with the laws of freedom. (CJ 5:472) The contention of this article is that Kant's notion of faith/belief (Glaube) as a "free affirmation" has a complex relationship with two central elements of the medieval tradition of reflection upon faith, going back to Thomas Aquinas and Hugh of Saint Victor. These two elements are, respectively: the claim that faith is sui generis, combining textures that belong to both knowledge and opinion; and the conviction that the will assents to the propositions of faith, holding to them with a certainty equivalent to knowledge, even without the evidence sufficient for the state of knowing.
It is a solid interpretative principle, which alone justifies the practice of the history of philosophy, that one can rarely understand the significance and meaning of what any thinker says about a subject simply by reading what that thinker alone says on this subject, in isolation from their intellectual heritage and sources. This principle applies in this case: through reading Kant alone on Glaube, neglecting his sources and the wider tradition, we receive only a partial sense of the strands of continuity and rupture with the previous tradition, and so only a limited sense of the extent to which Kant is adopting either a traditional, or a "deflationary," position. We find a good example of the potential for such a partial understanding when we consider Kant's treatment of the relationship between t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h faith, grace, and moral conversion, as set out in the Conflict of the Faculties, where he engages with the Pietistic theology of Spener and Franck. As we will see in the first part of this article, Kant shares common ground with the Pietists, insofar as they associate faith with freedom and with morality. The key difference that Kant articulates between his account and that of the Pietists lies in the identification of the ultimate source of the freedom involved in faith. Kant maintains that such freedom is "supersensible," and entirely our own. Spener and Franck hold that this freedom is "supernatural," having its origins in divine action. Although from this one understands that Kant disagrees with the Pietists, one might still harbor the suspicion that he has a positive, perhaps largely traditional, conception both of faith and grace and of the relationship between divine action and faith. It is only when one reads Kant's own sources in the light of the medieval tradition that one becomes aware of the way in which Kant consciously swerves away from that tradition of theological reflection, as he would have received it.
I begin demonstrating the continuities and discontinuities between Kant and the medieval tradition in the second part of the article, where I attend to the origins of the notion of faith as a free affirmation. I outline the account of faith given by Thomas Aquinas and Hugh of St. Victor, and then proceed to track how this tradition is mediated through Kant's own sources, predominantly in texts by Leibniz and Locke. Although Meier is often cited as the figure from whom Kant might have received the "opinion, belief, knowledge" trio, it turns out that Meier is not likely to be a source for him on this narrow front. Indeed, in employing the trio, Kant seems explicitly to challenge features of Meier's analysis of Glaube.
This provides the necessary background for a detailed anatomy, set out in section 3, of Kant's own treatment of the epistemic category of 'faith,' as he contrasts it, following Locke and Leibniz, with the categories of opinion and knowledge. On the side of "continuities" with the prior tradition, we are able to confirm that an emphasis upon the voluntary nature of belief in God is perfectly traditional. This is significant, as Kant's language of free-choice with respect to belief in God can tempt us to read his religious commitment in rather deflationary terms.
3 Briefly stated, the suggestion behind such deflationary accounts is that Kant does not recommend belief in God so much as proceeding, for heuristic or practical purposes, as if there is a God. This article demonstrates that Kant's use of the language of free choice and free affirmation cannot reasonably be used as evidence in support of such deflationary readings. We might, of course, have other reasons for interpreting Kant's belief in God in deflationary terms, although I do not address that possibility in this article. Regardless, by talking about faith as a free affirmation, Kant aligns himself closely with a traditional understanding, going back to Aquinas, and mediated to him through figures such as Leibniz and Locke. This tradition consistently, affirmatively, and systematically invokes freedom and the will with reference to our belief in God. To this extent, then, Kant's invocation of free-will in the context of faith is traditional and, as I will show, he would know this.
Equally, however, our engagement with the historical sources of the notion of free belief reveals where Kant makes some distinctive intra-theological moves, specifically involving how he conceives of the role of divine action in relation to human freedom. To say, as both Kant and Aquinas (and others) do, that a belief must be a "free affirmation" is not yet to say very much until we know what human freedom amounts to, both in its own terms, and in relation to divine action. In relation to this issue, of human freedom in relation to divine action, I show, in section 4, that Kant's position constitutes a rupture with all of his theological sources, which sources affirm that faith comes primarily, and originally, from divine action through grace and revelation. Kant, for reasons that go to the heart of his philosophical project, takes a stance that sets him in opposition to the entire prior theological tradition, insofar as he insists that faith must be an act of our own freedom, of our own practical reason, without divine action or intervention. Nonetheless, as I show in section 5, Kant does develop a positive reinterpretation of the theological categories of grace, and of divine cooperation with human action, which, by Kant's own lights, does not violate what he considers to be required for human beings to enjoy genuine freedom.
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Curiously, then, by reading Kant alone, without knowing about the historical origins of the association of freedom with faith, we can get things precisely the wrong way around. Kant's emphasis on the need for a voluntary dimension in the case of belief in God can look rather "post-Christian" and deflationary, relegating such belief to a heuristic category of believing "as if" there is a God. In turn, Kant's discussion of the way in which grace follows moral conversion can look more traditional, with the apparently rather pious association of ethical behavior and religious belief. In truth, as we will see, it is the former that is traditional, and the latter that is revolutionary. It is revolutionary because of Kant's repeated insistence that grace follows rather than precedes moral conversion.
Recently, there have been a number of sophisticated treatments of Kant's account of 'belief' (Glaube), or, depending upon the translation, 'faith,' to which I am indebted.
5 The existing literature mentions, but does not explore extensively, as I do here, the role of the will in Kant's understanding of religious belief.
6 Some commentators have drawn attention to the similarity between the scholastic analysis of "opinion, belief, and knowledge" and Kant's use of this trio of terms. The precise lines of transmission, from scholastic theology to Kant, tend to be gestured toward meaningfully, but rather vaguely, often with a nod to Meier.
7 Leslie Stevenson comments about the "opinion, belief, knowledge" trio that it "seems to have been part of the conventional wisdom of Kant's day," and that "presumably it had been handed down from medieval theology," although Stevenson adds, "I t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h do not know by what route."
8 This article shows what this route might have been. Alix Cohen has done invaluable work on the role of the will in Kant's wider notion of epistemic responsibility, with an explicit focus on "empirical beliefs . . . that are always, at least in principle, susceptible of evidential support."
9 Cohen does not explore, as I do here, the (doxastically responsible) role of the will in the context of religious beliefs, which, in contrast to empirical beliefs, are not, Kant thinks, susceptible to evidential support.
1 . f a i t h a n d g r a c e : k a n t a n d t h e p i e t i s t s
In the Conflict of the Faculties, Kant is concerned with the relationship between grace, moral conversion, and faith. Kant praises Spener, insofar as "the valiant Spener called out fervently to all ecclesiastical teachers" that
The end of religious instruction must be to make us other human beings and not merely better human beings (as if we were already good but only negligent about the degree of our goodness). (CF 7:54) Kant offers two cheers for Spener, insofar as Spener has understood that the proper task is to ask "not only what Christianity is," but "also how to set about teaching it so that it will really be present in the hearts of human beings," so that "religious faith will also make human beings better" (CF 7:53). Kant only partially agrees with Spener. Kant agrees that 'faith' requires a moral conversion; but, Kant disagrees with the way in which Spener draws a link between 'faith' (so understood) and 'grace,' whereby, for Spener, "faith is an effect of grace" (CF 7:56) .
As I will demonstrate, Kant identifies what he considers to be the key difference between his position and Spener's on the specific question of grace in relation to moral conversion: the difference lies in the distinction between the 'supersensible' (übersinnlich) and the 'supernatural' (übernatürlich). Where Kant invokes the category of the 'supersensible,' which is to say, the realm of non-spatial and nontemporal noumenal freedom, Spener makes the mistake of thinking in terms of the 'supernatural,' which involves divine action. Precisely what we should make of Kant's notion of 'supersensible,' noumenal freedom is highly contested in Kant studies, and I do not propose to settle this issue here.
10 But what everybody has to concede is that, in some sense (deflationary or metaphysical), Kant is committed to the notion of non-temporal and non-spatial freedom. This has to be accepted because Kant so often makes recourse to such a conception of freedom, 11 with the Conflict of the Faculties (from the late 1790s) being one more example. Talking about moral conversion, whereby we become the "new man" (CF 7:59), Kant affirms that we need to invoke a "supersensible freedom," because "the means to this end cannot be empirical-since empirical means could undoubtedly affect our actions but not our attitude [Gesinnung] " (CF 7:54) . A problem arises, though, when one thinks that the "supersensible [Übersinnliche] must also be supernatural [übernatürlich] ," that is, as involving "God's direct influence" (CF 7:54). 8 Stevenson, "Opinion, Belief or Faith," 97n1. 9 Cohen, "Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism," 33-55. Kant's aversion to this notion of divine action upon us has deep roots in his thought, going right down to his fundamental conception of what genuine human freedom must consist in. "Freedom cannot be divided," Kant insists, such that "the human being is either entirely free or not free at all" (Refl., 4229, 17:467) . Freedom must be a "faculty of starting . . . events from itself [sponte], i.e., without the causality of the cause itself having to begin, and hence without need for any other ground to determine its beginning" (Prolegomena, 4:344; see also A 446/B 474). Kant is clear that God acting upon us would be an "alien cause" (CPrR 5:95), 12 which would destroy freedom, described by Kant as the "inner value of the world" ("Moral Mrongovius," 27:1482) . Kant thus has a zero-sum account of the relationship between divine action and human freedom. Human freedom is only possible where God withdraws. Accordingly, Kant also explicitly rejects the traditional scholastic conception of concursus or "concurrence" (although not, as we will see, all construals), whereby it is maintained (albeit mysteriously) that divine and human action can run together, directly and fully, in single action, such that God is the immediate and direct efficient cause of a free human action:
It is not permitted to think of God's concursus with free actions. . . . If God concurs with morality, then the human being has no moral worth, because nothing can be imputed to him.
13 (DR 28:1309) Kant does concede that we cannot know that divine cooperation is impossible (Rel., 6:44, 52, 142-43; see also "Pölitz," 28:1106 see also "Pölitz," 28: , 1110 . This has led Pasternack, for example, to talk suggestively of Kant being "agnostic" as to "whether or not we receive any Divine assistance in our efforts to morally improve ourselves."
14 Patrick Kain also writes that Kant leaves "conceptual room for some kind of dependence within creaturely agency and for the possibility of divine concurrence and divine [fore]knowledge of human free actions."
15 Similarly, and correctly, Jacqueline Mariña points out that "God's supernatural cooperation in our becoming better persons" is not, for Kant, something that we know to be "impossible." But, as Mariña goes on to observe, "its possibility remains inscrutable" such that, "even if it were posited, on a practical level we wouldn't be able to make use of such a supposition."
16 Kant warns that neither theoretical nor practical reason can make any positive use of such a concept of divine action (Rel., 6:53). That said, as I show in section 5, Kant does find an acceptable reinterpretation of the categories of grace and of divine cooperation with human action, such that, under this reinterpretation, these concepts can be used within the limits of the pure religion of reason. When I write that Kant rejects a 'traditional' account of grace and concurrence, this qualifier is vital, as he is willing to recommend a reinterpreted and Kantian account of grace and divine cooperation. t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h Turning away from traditional accounts of divine cooperation and grace, Kant searches for "another principle for solving Spener's problem" (CF 7:58) , which is to say, the correctly identified need for the human being to turn towards the moral law. We find such a principle when we contemplate "our ability so to sacrifice our sensuous nature to morality," such that "that we can do what we quite readily and clearly conceive we ought to do" (CF 7:58):
This ascendancy of the supersensible human being in us over the sensible . . . is an object of the greatest wonder ; and our wonder at this moral predisposition in us, inseparable from our humanity, only increases the longer we contemplate this true (not fabricated) ideal. Kant diagnoses the tendency to interpret this capacity in supernatural terms as understandable, but mistaken:
Since the supersensible in us is inconceivable and yet practical, we can well excuse those who are led to consider it supernatural-that is, to regard it as the influence of another and higher spirit, something not within our power and not belonging to us as our own. Yet they are greatly mistaken in this, since on their view the effect of this power would not be our deed and could not be imputed to us, and so the power to produce it would not be our own. (CF 7:59; see also Rel., 6:51)
As already indicated, Kant's detailed disagreements with Spener and Franck can lead us to see the trees, rather than the forest, if we accept his own presentation of his discussion as a critique of a strand of Pietistic theology. When, though, we place Kant's critique within a wider context, we see that his particular appropriation of the notion of faith as dependent upon human freedom at once both resonates with, and signals a departure from, the theological tradition. The task of the next section, therefore, is to give an account of this tradition.
I suggest that Locke and Leibniz are likely to have been important sources for Kant. Nonetheless, in setting out a possible route through which Kant could have received these traditional conceptions of Glaube, my aim is not to rule out the possibility of other influences and sources, more or less diffuse, and that may in time be unveiled by other scholars. The point is, rather, to avoid drawing anachronistic parallels between scholasticism and Kant by showing how something like the scholastic account was mediated to him through more immediate and demonstrably known sources.
2 . t h e o r i g i n s o f t h e n o t i o n o f f r e e b e l i e f b e t w e e n o p i n i o n a n d k n o w l e d g e
When considering scholastic and early modern treatments of faith, we are particularly concerned to track two commitments, which, we will see in section 3, are features of Kant's own treatment of Glaube in continuity with a tradition of theological reflection. As already outlined, these commitments are as follows: first, that faith combines elements of opinion and knowledge and, second that the will assents to the propositions of faith, holding to them with a certainty equivalent to knowledge, albeit without meeting the evidential requirements necessary to count as knowledge.
Thomas Aquinas
The trail begins, for us, with Aquinas, who declares that we are in a state of belief when we have evidence that is sufficient only for opinion, but adhere to the proposition with the certainty appropriate to knowledge. What makes up for this absence of evidence is the movement of the will, which chooses to believe. So, in the act of believing, of which belief in God is the paradigm, the believer "settles upon one side of the question," in "virtue of his will [per voluntatem]" (Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.2.1). This means that the believer becomes "firmly attached to one alternative," and so "is in the same state of mind as one who has science or understanding" (Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.2.1), even though belief is "imperfect as knowledge," as it is "without clarity or vision" (Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae.67.3).
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As Debora Shuger explains, Aquinas is able to exploit an ambiguity in the Latin term certus ("certainty"), which can mean "(a) established by the evidence, proven," and/or "(b) resolved upon, decided."
19 In a way that will be illuminating for understanding Kant's distinction between what he calls 'objective' and 'subjective' sufficiency (see sect. 3), we can distinguish between the certainty of evidence and the certainty of adherence. It is in the second sense that faith enjoys certainty, inasmuch as such certus refers to, and requires, an act of the will. Faith holds a "middle place," surpassing "opinion because its adhesion is firm [firmam inhaesionem]," but falling "short of knowledge [scientia], because it lacks vision" (Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae.67.3).
20 This distinction rests upon what Shuger identifies as the central dilemma of "all pre-modern epistemology," 21 which is that there is an "inverse proportion between the excellence of an object and its knowability: the more excellent the object, the less knowable to us."
22 This goes back to Aristotle, who in the Posterior Analytics distinguishes between what is, on the one hand, "prior and more knowable . . . in nature" and, on the other hand, that which is more knowable "in relation to us." It is the lesser objects that are "more knowable" in "relation to us," because they are "nearer to our perception," while the objects "more knowable" in themselves are "further" from our perception:
The most universal concepts are furthest from our perception and particulars are nearest to it . . . these are opposite to one another. (Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b35-72a6) For Aquinas, it is the movement of the will that overcomes this absence of evidence in this life with respect to matters of faith, in that it "adheres totally" to faith by virtue of the "will, which chooses to assent determinately and precisely to one part because of something that is sufficient to move the will but not sufficient to move the intellect" (De veritate, 14.1). Aquinas's position is often summarized as the claim that "faith is mid-way between science and opinion" (fides est media inter t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h scientiam et opinionem [Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.1.2]). Aquinas himself derives this statement from the "widely accepted" scholastic "definition of faith" presented by Hugh of St Victor: "faith is a form of mental certitude about distant realities that is greater than opinion and less than science."
23 I have at points mirrored this standard usage, and will continue to do so, talking of belief as being "between" knowledge and opinion. Nonetheless, this phrasing should come with a caveat. It is important for Aquinas, as indeed it will be for Kant, that the conceptual space of being "between" opinion and knowledge is not to be understood as the meanpoint of a continuous spectrum, whereby one can straightforwardly move, by accumulating evidence, from opinion, through faith, to knowledge.
24 Faith, rather, is "between" in the sense of being sui generis, sharing features with both opinion and knowledge, enjoying a certitude that is greater than opinion, yet different to knowledge, because not grounded upon sufficient evidence. Kant did not himself read scholastic sources such as Thomas Aquinas and Hugh of St Victor, but the key features of this theological tradition are demonstrably mediated to Kant through texts that we know he studied. It is to these texts that we now turn.
Meier, Leibniz, and Locke
As I remarked above, when commentators draw attention to the traditional nature of Kant's trio of opinion, belief, and knowledge, they tend to nod in the direction of Meier. 25 In what immediately follows, I will show that although, in broad terms, much of what Meier says about practical reason is indeed influential on Kant, when we get to the more specific claims about 'belief' (Glaube) in the context of religion, we do not find the two distinctive features of the tradition that interest us: faith being construed as mid-way between opinion and knowledge, and as involving the will assenting to religious propositions with certainty. Furthermore, when, in section 3, we get into the fine details of the way in which Kant himself distinguishes "opinion" from "belief" in the context of religion, we find that he explicitly disagrees with Meier on a range of points. Far from being Kant's main source for the traditional trio of opinion, belief, and knowledge, I will show that by adopting this trio, Kant aligns himself against Meier.
Where Meier does plausibly emerge as a positive influence upon Kant is in the former's considerable interest both in practical reason and in a type of practical certainty. In the Auszug, Meier writes that "all learned cognition is either practical or speculative," and that "cognition is practical, in so far as it is able to move us in a particular way, to do or omit an action." 26 Meier goes on to comment that "whoever wants to improve as much as possible his learned cognition, must aver 23 T. C. O'Brien, in Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.1.2, 11n.; Hugh of St Victor, quoted by T. C. O'Brien in Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.1.2, 11n.
24 I qualify this claim with 'straightforwardly' because, for Aquinas, one does move, eventually, although not in this life, from faith to knowledge. It is "not straightforward," in that one does not do this by accumulating evidence, but through a transformative participation in divine action, if and when one is elected by God to enjoy God's own self-knowledge, which is the beatific vision. There is no parallel idea in Kant's philosophy, for reasons that are set out in sect. 4 of this article. 
[verhüten] speculation, and seek according to practical reason,"
27 even going as far as to claim that "no true learned cognition is by its nature speculative, but only by virtue of the lack of insight of the learned, who cannot perceive the connection with human action, or will not see it."
28 In the Vernunftlehre, Meier goes as far as to proclaim that "moral certainty," which concerns rational and virtuous action, should be estimated to enjoy the equivalent of "mathematical certainty."
29 Much of this resonates strongly with the priority, certainty, and ubiquity of practical reason in Kant's critical philosophy (see A 795/B 823-A 831/B 859). 30 We might also discern the influence of Meier's account of practical reason where Kant talks about pragmatischer Glaube, which, for Kant, are beliefs and acceptances that guide practice, such as, for example, the doctor diagnosing an illness, or the businessman striking a deal (see A 824/B 852; "Jäsche," 9:67-68n).
Nonetheless, I have not been able to find, either in Meier's Vernunftlehre, or in the abbreviated version of this text, the Auszug (which was heavily used and annotated by Kant), the traditional feature of faith that we will identify in Kant: that faith is somehow a 'stage' (Stufe) or a hybrid between opinion and knowledge, and that the will assents to the propositions of faith, holding to them with a certainty equivalent to knowledge. In the Auszug, where Meier discusses belief, he affirms that "to believe means, to accept [annehmen] something for the sake of a witness," with the scope of such belief limited to "past, present and future things," and not to "other truths."
31 In the longer Vernunftlehre, Meier gives a more extensive account of the sort of things that can be witnessed to: not only past, present, and future events, but also that which is good for the soul and our eternal well-being.
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Religious claims certainly come under this aegis. With respect to such claims, Meier recommends not certainty, but a "happy middle-state which consists of rational belief," avoiding both "incredulity" (die Ungläubigkeit) and "credulity" (die Leichtgläubigkeit).
I have also not been able to find these two distinctive features of scholastic teaching in key texts by Baumgarten or Crusius. 33 Wolff, promisingly, has a chapter title that contains the trio "Wissenschaft, Glauben, Meinungen."
34 But Wolff does not describe belief as a stage or hybrid between knowledge and opinion. Also, we do not find Wolff associating belief with an act of the will. By 'belief,' Wolff means, simply, "the approval, which one gives to a statement by virtue of the witness of another."
35 Having set out his account of 'belief,' the remainder of Wolff's discussion of 'belief' is dedicated to setting out grounds for attributing trustworthiness, or lack thereof, to a witness. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken, ch. 7, §19. t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h
We get much closer to Kant's treatment of Glaube, in relation to Meinung and Wissen, when we look at the work of John Locke. We know Locke to have been a significant figure for Kant because of numerous references throughout his corpus, 37 and particularly to the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (see Prolegomena, 4:270) . We also know that Kant read Poley's translation of Locke's Essay.
38 More significant still, for our purposes, is that Kant explicitly refers to a particular passage from the Essay, which sits in precisely the part of Locke's text which lays out the various types of assent, such as knowledge, belief, and opinion.
39 In the translation of Locke that Kant would have read, as I will show, we find the two relevant features of the scholastic discussion: that belief is in some sense between knowledge and opinion, and that the will is involved in belief. Kant may also have received the relevant passages from Locke mediated through Leibniz's French commentary on Locke (New Essays), itself based upon a translation (into French) by Pierre Coste.
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In any case, whether through Locke via Poley (in German), or Locke via Leibniz (in French), it seems possible that Locke could have been a source for Kant.
Locke introduces the trio in the context of considering cases where we adhere to a truth, but where "the Demonstration, by which it was at first known, is forgot, though a Man may be thought rather to believe his Memory, than really to know." About "this way of entertaining a Truth," Locke says that it "seem'd formerly to me" to be "like something between Opinion and Knowledge, a sort of Assurance which exceeds bare Belief, for that relies on the Testimony of another."
41
As Kant would have read the passage just set out above, it is rendered by Poley in the following translation:
Diese Art, eine Wahrheit anzunehmen, mir vormals etwas zu seyn schien, das fast zwischen der Meinung und der Wissenschaft das Mittel hält, eine Gattung der Gewißheit, die noch über den bloßen Glauben geht, als welcher sich auf das Zeugnis eines andern gründet. (Versuch, Bk. IV, Ch.1, §9, 528-29)
Locke's estimation of this epistemic texture has increased, as he goes on to say that "upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in effect true Knowledge" (befinde ich bei einer rechten Untersuchung dennoch, daß die einer vollkommenen Gewißheit nichts nachgiebt, und in der That eine wahre Erkenntniß ist). 42 Leibniz, following Locke, renders the relevant passage in the following terms:
In such a case [of a remembered demonstration] "it seemed to me like something between opinion and knowledge, a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief In Prolegomena 4:270, Kant explicitly cites (giving the reference) IV.iii.9, 544, which occurs within the section of the Essay dedicated to types of assent (IV.i.1, 525 -IV.xxviii.11, 696). Locke, Essay, IV.i.9, 528-29. 42 Locke, Essay, IV.i.9, 528-29.
[relying] on testimony of another; yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty."
43 (New Essays, IV.1.9)
In his later text, Theodicy (1710), Leibniz, significantly, applies such a "going beyond opinion" not only to the case of remembered demonstrations, but in the context of belief in God:
Nevertheless divine faith itself, when it is kindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion [etwas mehr, als eine blosse Meinung], and depends not upon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; it advances beyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of the heart, to make us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands. Then we have no further need to think of reasons or to pause over the difficulties of argument which the mind may anticipate. (Theodicy, §29, 91) Kant could also have found in Locke (via Poley and/or Leibniz) the notion that belief, as a firm assent of the mind, is often necessary in cases of practical reason. Locke writes that there are cases where "we are forced to determine our selves on the one side or other":
The conduct of our Lives, and the management of our great Concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our Judgement in points, wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrable Knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace [ergreifen müssen] the one side, or the other. (Essay, IV.xvi.3, 658-59) 44 We find, therefore, that there is often a "necessity of believing, without knowledge" (ohne gewisse Erkenntniß . . . glauben müssen), "in this fleeting state of Action and Blindness."
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There is a feature of Locke's original discussion that becomes obscured in the German translation, possibly with creative results for Kant. Locke uses two terms ('belief' and 'faith'), where the German translation uses just one (Glaube). Locke uses the term 'belief' in the context of "mundane" beliefs, and the word 'faith' only in the context of "revelation." Poley uses the term Glaubensache ("matters of faith") only in the context of revelation, but otherwise will happily use Glaube and glauben to cover both Locke's mundane 'belief' and religious 'faith.' It is hard to be certain, but the intriguing possibility arises that certain connections in Kant's mind could have been assisted by a number of conflations occurring in the process of translation. Possibly, it might have assisted Kant to come to his position that Locke (as read in the German) uses the same term, Glaube, to convey both urgent practical assents and religious propositions. This may have eased the movement in Kant's mind from the urgent needs of practical reason to the categories of faith. Locke, in the original English, held these two categories apart, but this distinction is obscured in the German translation.
When Locke does explicitly discuss religious 'faith' (translated simply as Glaube), he describes it as the "Assent [Beifall] to any Proposition, not thus made out by Deductions of Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer," that is, "as coming
43
Where Locke has "belief, for that relies on," Coste translates this as "croyance qui est fondée sur," which in Leibniz becomes "croyance fondée sur." For these details, see Leibniz's New Essays, 360n2. 44 Leibniz also includes this passage from Locke, translated into French, in New Essays, IV.16.3, 460. 45 Locke, Essay, IV.xvi.4, 660. t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h from GOD, in some extraordinary way of communication," which "we call Revelation [Offenbarung] ."
46 The scope of 'revelation' is heavily circumscribed by Locke: it must not "shake or over-rule plain Knowledge," or be "in a direct contradiction to the clear Evidence" of our "own understanding."
47 Indeed, whether something "be divine Revelation, or no, Reason [Vernunft] must judge."
48 Nonetheless, "an evident Revelation," Locke affirms, "ought to determine our Assent even against Probability":
Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, Faith gave the Determination [der Glaube es bestimmt], where Reason came short; and Revelation discovered on which side the Truth lay. (Essay, IV.xviii.9, 695) "Faith," informed by revelation, "ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests, and hath a right to be received with full Assent [mit völligem Beifall] ," in a way that "shakes not the Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for which they were given us."
49 Describing the "Assent," which is given to "Faith," Locke writes that it "absolutely determines our Minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering as our Knowledge it self":
Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt and Hesitation. (Essay, IV.xvi.14, 667)
As well as locating faith between opinion and knowledge, Locke and Leibniz both support the notion of a legitimate 'assent' (Beifall) to religious propositions, where the certainty attached to this assent goes beyond the probable evidence. This "going beyond" is achieved, as it is in the scholastic tradition, by a direct act of the will. Also consonant with the traditional conception of faith, this act of the will does not lessen the commitment to the truth of what is so believed.
What emerges is that, through Locke and Leibniz (and Leibniz reading Locke), we can tentatively identify a possible, albeit delicate, bridge back into the scholastic sources. Locke could have received a traditional account of faith from Richard Hooker, who himself drew upon Thomas Aquinas. We know that Locke read and esteemed Hooker, although precisely how much he read is hard to determine.
50
In any case, Hooker communicates at least two strands of the traditional scholastic account of faith.
51 First, that faith is an action of the will. Second, that the "certainty of adherence" is "greater in us" than the certainty of evidence, because "the hart doth cleave and stick unto that which it doth believe," so that "all the world is 46 Locke, Essay, IV.xviii.2, 689. 47 Locke, Essay, IV.xviii. 5, 691. 48 Locke, Essay, IV.xvii.10, 695. 49 Locke, Essay, IV.xviii.10, 696. Christian August Crusius similarly talks of revelation as God offering a supplement to our knowledge about divine matters, although we do not find any explicit lexical linking of Glaube with revelation (Offenbarung): through "revelation," "it is in many ways possible, that God can add to the natural cognitions of divine truths" (Entwurf, §376). On this point, see Shuger, "Faith and Assurance," 239-40.
not able quite and cleane to remove him from it."
52 Accordingly, Locke, possibly drawing on Hooker, affirms that 'belief' requires an assent of the will. Such belief goes beyond the evidence, although the believer is fully committed to the truth of what is assented to. Now that we have a sense of how the scholastic tradition could have been mediated to Kant, we are well-prepared to consider his various texts about the status of Glaube in relation to opinion and knowledge. We will find that both continuities and discontinuities emerge between Kant and the medieval heritage that he receives.
3 . k a n t o n o p i n i o n , b e l i e f , a n d k n o w l e d g e
In 1796, Kant summarizes the "three stages of apprehension, down to its disappearance in total ignorance" (RPT 8:396). The three stages are "knowledge, belief, and opinion" (RPT 8:396). Consistently, in a range of other texts, Kant splices this traditional distinction with his own hardly limpid terminology of subjective and objective sufficiency. We find the following in the Canon of the first Critique: Kant's confidence that he does not need to pause "for the exposition of such readily grasped concepts" has been found by later commentators to be too optimistic (A 822/B 850). In fact, though, when looking at Kant's wider oeuvre, 53 in particular his lectures on logic given in the 1780s and 90s, it is indeed clear and unambiguous what he means by these terms. The best way to understand precisely how Kant construes the role of "subjective sufficiency" in "belief" is to contrast this with how he uses this notion in the alternative states of knowing and opining.
The State of Knowing
When our 'holding-for-true' has the status of knowledge, objective and subjective sufficiency run together:
When taking something to be true is both subjectively and objectively sufficient it is called knowing. (A 822/B 850) 52 Shuger, "Faith and Assurance," 239.
53
In helping to track down some of the references in Kant's works to "subjective and objective sufficiency," which I discuss in the following sections, I am indebted to Pasternack, "Kant on Opinion," 43-44ns4 and 6. t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h Kant never discusses a type of "holding-to-be-true" that enjoys objective but not subjective sufficiency. It is worthwhile taking some time to understand why the state of knowing, for Kant, enjoys both objective and subjective sufficiency, when one might think it would be enough for knowledge to be "objectively sufficient." The key lies in Kant's insistence that his "science of logic" is concerned not with the truth of propositions, but with the relationship between such truths and our judgement (that is, judgements made by subjects). In the 1790s, Kant explains that, while "truth is an objective property of cognition . . . , the relation to an understanding and thus to a particular subject, is, subjectively, holding-to-be-true" ("Jäsche," 9:65-66).
54 Fundamentally, we have here a distinction between evidence and adherence, already explored in section 2: on the one hand, the evidence that belongs to the "object" itself (Euclid's theorems, for example), and, on the other hand, the 'holding-to-be-true,' which pertains to the assent given by a judging subject.
55 The "ground of determination to approval" is "composed of objective and subjective grounds," although most people, Kant complains, "do not analyze this mixed effect" ("Jäsche," 9:73). This distinction, between evidence and adherence, will become important further down, when we come to Kant's account of the role of the will in 'belief. ' First, though, we need to understand the heavily circumscribed and limited role of the will, for Kant, in the state of knowing. Alix Cohen demonstrates that there is an important contrast, in Kant's writings, between the state of knowing and the process of acquiring knowledge.
56 In the state of knowing, the will has no immediate role, although in the process of acquiring knowledge, it does have what can be called an indirect role. Kant's distinction between knowing, and the process of acquiring knowledge, circles around a fairly intuitive distinction, shared and refined by recent epistemologists, 57 and encapsulated nicely by Cohen, when 54 Given this understanding of the distinction between objective and subjective sufficiency, it seems plausible to suggest that the neglected "fourth space" (objective sufficiency but without subjective sufficiency) could be characterized as a state of 'ignorance,' where we are considering something that in itself would be intelligible, to a competent (perhaps divine) understanding, but that is, perhaps in principle, unavailable to us. In this connection, for an exploration of the significance of our ignorance about the "real possibilities" that govern things-in-themselves, see Andrew Chignell, "Kant on Cognition," and "Real Repugnance." See also Rae Langton, Kantian Humility.
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A possible source for Kant's distinction, in something like these terms, between subjective and objective certainty in relation to religion is Gottfried Ephraim Lessing. Lessing draws a distinction between "objective and subjective religion" (unterscheid zwischen objectiver und subjectiver religion [Sämtliche Schriften, 10:234] ). "Subjective" religion involves a transformation of the adhering subject through the "inner truth" of Christianity, leading to wide-scale implications for ethical practice. Christianity in itself, for Lessing, does enjoy "objective certainty," but this certainty is not available to us, given our epistemic limitations (Eine Parabel, Sämtliche Schriften, 13:93-96). There is a precedent for using the distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' certainty in this way (mapping on to the traditional distinction between certainty of evidence and adherence), going back as far as 1696. Richard Baxter, in the context of discussing Richard Hooker, distinguishes "subjective certainty" from "objective evidence" (Reliquiae Baxterianae, 109-11). For this point, I am indebted to Shuger, "Faith and Assurance," 249-50. The lines of transmission, from such a usage through to Lessing and Kant, are unclear, but could, perhaps, be traced.
56 For the account given here of the indirect role of the will in the state of knowing, I am indebted to Cohen, "Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism," 33-55. 57 See, e.g. Cohen, "Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism," 44; and Louis P. Pojman, "Believing, Willing, and the Ethics of Belief," 576-79.
she writes that "believing is indeed unlike acting," whereas "acquiring a belief is like action insofar as they are both guided by maxims that are under our direct voluntary control."
58
If, for example, we properly understand the terms involved in a Euclidean or philosophical proof, we must simply accept the demonstration, whether we like it or not. In such a case, Kant writes, "the will does not have any influence immediately [keinen unmittelbaren Einfluß] on holding-to-be-true," because "the will cannot struggle against convincing proofs of truth that are contrary to its wishes and inclinations" ("Jäsche," 9:73-74; see also " Dohna-Wundlacken Logic," 24:736; Refl., 2508, 16:398) . Aquinas, representative of the mainstream scholastic analysis, similarly reports that in such cases of knowledge, the "intellect is determined," with no proper scope for the will to dissent (De veritate, 14.1). When something is known in this way, as it is in the case of geometry, we give "absolute adherence" to the proposition in question (De veritate, 14.1). The case is different, for Kant, when it comes to undertaking responsible investigations into truth-claims, and developing a well-informed and critical attitude. Kant explains that, although "holding-to-be-true pertains to the understanding," "investigation" belongs "to the faculty of choice" " 24:746) . 59 In such a case, Kant explains, we would not say that "approval" depends "immediately" upon our "choice," but, rather, that it depends "on it indirectly, mediately":
Since it is according to one's free wish that he seeks out those grounds that could in any way bring about approval for this or that cognition. ("Blomberg Logic, " 24:158) Kant states that, although "for common cognition it is not necessary that we be conscious of these rules and reflect on them," if we wish to ascend to "learned cognition," in contested and complex areas, then "our understanding" must "be conscious of its rules and use them in accordance with reflection, because here common practice is not enough for it" ("Blomberg Logic," 24:27). In the state of knowing, the will has an "indirect" role in the process of acquiring knowledge, through the adoption and execution of second-order epistemic principles, which leads to an assent with certainty. By contrast, in the state of believing, the will has a "direct" role in the assenting with certainty. We will be better equipped to approach this aspect of 'belief,' in Kant, after we have analyzed the state of 'opining,' to which I now turn.
The State of Opining
The state of "opining," for Kant, is beset by a contingency and "insufficiency." Significantly, when we opine, we fail even to enjoy "subjective sufficiency." This indicates that "subjective sufficiency" is an epistemic achievement of some substance:
Opining is a holding-to-be-true that is, with consciousness, both subjectively and objectively insufficient. An insufficient holding-to-be-true is what does not suffice to exclude the opposite. He who only opines is still open to opposing grounds. ("DohnaWundlacken Logic," 24:732; see also A 822/B 850) 58 Cohen, "Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism," 44. 59 For this point, I am indebted to Cohen, "Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism," 44. t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h
We are in the state of opining when we hold to a proposition on grounds that are, in their current state, insufficient for knowledge, but where, if more evidence becomes available, the state of opining can become the state of knowing.
When something is held true on objective though consciously insufficient grounds, and hence is merely opinion, this opining can gradually be supplemented by the same kind of grounds and finally become a knowing. (WDO 8:141) On this point, Kant follows his immediate sources such as Wolff, Meier, and Locke, 60 who themselves trace over lines of thought that can be identified in the scholastic tradition, 61 which itself draws upon Aristotle.
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Whereas the state of knowing involves "apodeictic" or "assertoric" certainty, for rational and empirically resourced knowledge respectively, the state of opining only ever involves a "problematic" judging:
For what I merely opine I hold in judging, with consciousness, only to be problematic. ("Jäsche, " 9:66) Even though both objectively and subjectively insufficient, the state of opining is an unavoidable epistemic state. The state of opining can be preparatory for knowing ("Jäsche," 9:66-67; see also Refl., 2462, 16:380) . The important thing is not to avoid opining, but to "guard oneself against holding an opinion to be something more than mere opinion" ("Jäsche," 9:66). Similar warnings against ascribing too much weight to opinions are found in Kant's sources such as Locke and Meier, who again reflect material found in scholastic sources. 63 Meier states that in the case of opining, because one has "no demonstration" (keine Demonstration), there remains a "fear" (die Furcht), that "things might be other than assumed in the opinion" (es könne vielleicht auch wohl anders seyn). 64 The reference to 'fear' finds a direct scholastic counterpart, with Aquinas stating that to be in a state of opinion is to "assent to one of two opposite assertions, with fear of the other [cum formidine alterius], so that the adherence is not firm" (Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae.67.3), where, "by definition," "opinion" means that the "object is thought of as able to be otherwise than it is" (Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.1.5, ad 4).
The State of Believing
The state of knowing, we have seen, possesses the certainty of evidence ("objective sufficiency"), which carries automatically the certainty of adherence ("subjective sufficiency"). The state of opining lacks both the certainty of evidence, and the certainty of adherence; adherence would be improper, because the evidence is insufficient. The state of believing, though, involves the adherence (subjective sufficiency), but without the evidence (objective sufficiency):
We have a proper object of 'belief' when we are concerned with reason in its practical capacity, which concerns itself with what ought to be done:
The meaning of this form of assent, distinct from the opinion and knowledge that are founded on judgment in the theoretical sense, can now be expressed in the term belief, whereby we understand an assumption, presupposition or hypothesis, which is necessary only because it is necessarily implied by an objective practical rule of conduct. (Progress, 20:297) In this article, I am concerned, specifically, with the category of 'moral belief,' which, for Kant, is the strict and proper type of 'belief.' At points, Kant does discuss other types of belief, or, to use a term employed both by Kant and recent epistemology, other types of 'acceptance' (Annehmung).
65 Kant discusses "pragmatic" (A 824/B 852) and "doctrinal" belief/acceptance (A 826-27/B 854-55), relating, respectively, to beliefs/acceptances that guide practice (for example, the doctor diagnosing an illness), and beliefs/acceptances that guide investigation into the natural world. Belief in God as the intelligent designer of nature is, Kant claims, such a "doctrinal" belief, and is indispensable when seeking systematic patterns of order in the natural world. Moral belief in God, however, is different in kind from doctrinal and pragmatic belief (A 829/B 857). This is clarified in the late 1780s and 90s where Kant explains that "belief in the proper sense" is restricted to "moral belief in God" ("Jäsche," 9:72n; see also "Jäsche," 9: [67] [68] 66 :
This practical conviction is thus moral belief of reason, which alone can be called a belief in the proper sense and be opposed as such to knowledge and to all theoretical or logical conviction in general, because it can never elevate itself to knowledge.
("Jäsche," 9:72n)
The state of believing "in the proper sense," that is, belief in God and immortality, can never become knowledge:
Pure rational faith can never be transformed into knowledge by any natural data or reason or experience, because here the ground of holding true is merely subjective, namely a necessary need of reason (and as long as we are human beings it will always remain a need) to presuppose the existence of a highest being, but not to demonstrate it. (WDO 8:141) In the 1770s, Kant writes that such "moral belief" enjoys "moral certainty," and that this can be asserted "in all conscientiousness" (Refl., 2470, 16:383) . It is not that we can choose to "believe" anything we like with "moral certainty." Only where we need to believe something, in order to secure the project of morality, are we permitted to do so. In 1786, Kant insists that "rational faith," because it "rests on a need of reason's use with a practical intent," "is not inferior in degree to knowing, even though it is completely different from it in kind" . With such rational faith, we are properly conscious of the "firmness" (Fertigkeit) and t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h "unalterability" (Unveränderlichkeit) of the belief in God (WDO 8:141n), even though such belief is not "an insight" which does "justice to all the logical demands for certainty" (WDO 8:141) .
In his association of 'belief' with certainty, Kant can be seen to choose one set of sources over another. In particular, by ascribing certainty to 'belief,' Kant distances himself from Meier. This is significant because, as I have already commented, Meier is often identified as the most likely source for Kant's account of faith.
67 The terms in which Meier discusses "belief" are those that the scholastic tradition (and Kant) would associate with merely probable "opinion." Meier comments that "no mere belief can free us from fear of its opposite [von aller Furcht des Gegentheils] ."
68
Any belief is in the realm of "probability" (Wahrscheinlichkeit) .
69 This contrasts with Kant's insistence, in the early 1790s, that the "expression of probability," in the case of belief in God, is "altogether absurd" (Progress, 20:299) . This is because the "modality of our assent" (Progress, 20:297) , to the proposition that there is a God, is not a case of opinion, because the "super-sensible differs in its very species from the sensuously knowable" such that there is "no way at all of reaching it by those very same steps whereby we may hope to arrive at certainty in the field of the sensible":
Thus there is no approximation to it either, and therefore no assent whose logical value could be called probability. (Progress, 20:299) Kant shows himself to be aware of the identification of belief with probability, writing in 1796 that the term Glaube is "used, on occasion," as "a synonym for holding something to be probable" (RPT 8:396) . Kant is resolute that this is an inappropriate use of the term Glaube, because about "that which lies beyond all bounds of possible experience, we can say neither that it is probable, nor that it is improbable" (RPT 8:396n). Where the "object is in no way the object of a knowledge possible to us" such as with "the nature of the soul, qua living substance, in the absence of any connection with a body, i.e., as a spirit," then "about its possibility we can judge neither the probability nor the improbability, since we cannot judge at all" (RPT 8:396n):
For the alleged grounds of knowledge are in a series which comes nowhere near to the sufficient reason, and thus to knowledge itself, since they relate to something super-sensible of which, as such, no theoretical knowledge is possible. (RPT 8:396n) Kant goes on to attack another feature of Meier's account of Glaube. Meier, as we saw above, identifies belief with accepting "something for the sake of a witness," 70 which can include, for Meier, a witness making (more or less probable) religious statements about the soul.
71 Kant writes that Glaube is not, strictly speaking, the correct concept to apply to such "witness of another," which "allegedly has reference to something super-sensible" (RPT 8:396n) . This is because the "authenticity" of any "report" would always be "an empirical matter," and the "person in whose 67 See n. 12. 68 Meier, Vernunftlehre, §245. 69 Meier, Vernunftlehre, §245. 70 Meier, Auszug, §206; see "die historischen Glauben," in the Vernunftlehre, § §236-40. 71 Meier, Vernunftlehre, §240.
testimony I am to believe must be an object of an experience" (RPT 8:396n). The situation is made worse, not better, by claiming that the witness comes from a "super-sensible being," for I "can be taught by no experience" as to the "very existence" of this "being," nor "as to the fact that it is such a being who testifies this to me" (RPT 8:396n). The fact that "there is no theoretical belief in the supersensible" rules out the association of Glaube with probability or testimony, both of which, for Kant, are branches of theoretical reason (RPT 8:396n). It is only "in a practical (morally-practical) sense" that "a belief in the super-sensible is not only possible, but is actually inseparably bound up with that point of view" (RPT 8:396n).
Instead, Kant aligns himself with a strand of thought, traced in the last section through Leibniz, Locke, and Hooker, which goes back to the mainstream scholastic account set out by Aquinas. In this account, belief is sui generis, sharing features that belong to both opinion and knowledge: like opinion, it lacks the evidence sufficient for knowledge, but unlike opinion, belief is characterized by a willful certainty; the certainly resembles the state of knowing, but unlike knowing, belief requires a free assent of the will. As we saw, in the act of believing, of which belief in God is the paradigm, the believer "settles upon one side of the question," in "virtue of his will [per voluntatem]" (Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.2.1, ad 3), and becomes "firmly attached to one alternative," and "in this respect the believer is in the same state of mind as one who has science or understanding" (Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.2.1), even though belief is "imperfect as knowledge," as it is "without clarity or vision" (Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae.67.3).
Conviction (for Myself)
We are now in a position to dispel the apparently "relativistic" associations ("true for me") that might surround Kant's talk of subjective sufficiency providing "conviction (for myself)" (A 822/B 850), "only for me" ("Jäsche," 9:66), but not "certainty (for everyone)" (A 822/B 850), which "holds for all" ("Jäsche," 9:66). It is helpful to always have in sight the contrast with the states of knowing and opining. As we saw, the state of knowing does not arise from a positive and direct free movement of the will. The will is, as we saw, mediately involved, through the selection and execution of second-order epistemic principles of investigation. Nonetheless, in the state of knowing, when presented with a mathematical or philosophical demonstration, for example, there is no role for free choice, as what is known is "universally and objectively necessary (holding for all)" ("Jäsche," 9:66). In the state of opining, strictly speaking, we should not be "convinced" (überzeugt) at all. The will has, accordingly, a limited role, namely, that of adopting (in an unconvinced way) various hypotheses, as and when they are useful, potentially even switching between inconsistent hypotheses, if a project of enquiry is benefitted by so doing. To this extent, there is a degree of freedom in the state of opining, although it is a freedom from assent, not towards it. As Kant puts the contrast, "with belief one accepts something, and one is decided [entschieden] . With opinion . . . one is still free" (Refl., 2463, 16:381) . 72 It is only in the domain of belief that the will, for
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My translation. t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h Kant, plays a role that is positive and immediate: moving (properly) in freedom, to assent with certainty, to that which cannot be known. As we saw in section 2, we find this same commitment paralleled in the scholastic tradition, represented by Aquinas, and mediated to Kant through sources such as Locke and Leibniz. For Kant, the will is universally summoned to belief, albeit not compelled. Every single individual "I" contemplating the "laws of freedom," which require belief in the possibility of the "highest good in the world," ought, in freedom, to believe in God, on moral grounds. The subjective grounds of moral belief universally require belief, which Kant reflects can "possess practical adequacy for all human beings" (Refl., 2470, 16:383) . But these same grounds do not compel assent in the way that Euclid's laws do. When Kant writes that subjective grounds hold "for me," we need to understand that "me" is a type of "every-me" (along the lines of "everyman"): "me" refers to every moral subject determining their attitude, in freedom, to the moral law. The justification for believing is indexed to these universally binding, but resistible (hence the freedom), demands of practical reason, and not to the particular constitution and temperament of any empirical individual. So when Kant writes that the "free holding-to-be-true" is "necessary for moral purposes for completion of one's ends" ("Jäsche," 9:69n), he means the completion of the rational ends of any and every moral being, and which involves the "necessity" of accepting "the objective reality of a concept (of the highest good)," where "the condition of this possibility" is "God, freedom, and immorality" ("Jäsche," 9:68n).
When Kant writes, therefore, that belief "yields a conviction [Überzeugung] that is not communicable (because of its subjective ground)" (Refl., 2489, 16:391-92) , he is doing no more than stating the (now) obvious point that belief is not knowledge. Only knowledge can be "communicated" in the strong sense of automatically eliciting "universal agreement." This is because, in the state of knowledge, the will has no (proper and direct) choice whether to assent or not, such that no direct work needs to be done by the will. Kant sets out the contrast between unfree-knowing and free-believing in precisely these terms:
The only objects that are matters of belief are those in which holding-to-be-true is necessarily free [nothwendig frei], i.e., is not determined through objective grounds [objektive Gründe] of truth that are independent of the nature and the interest of the subject. ("Jäsche, " 9:70) In explaining that belief is "free," Kant draws a contrast with the lack of freedom in the case of knowledge, where the "objective grounds of truth" simply compel the assent of the judging subject. Whenever Kant talks about the state of believing as only something "for me," the concept of freedom is never far away, and the contrast is always the lack of (immediate and positive) freedom involved with knowing:
What remains here is a free holding-to-be-true, which is necessary only in a practical respect given a priori, hence a holding-to-be-true of what I accept on moral grounds, and in such a way that I am certain that the opposite can never be proved. ("Jäsche, " 9:67) Hence I can only say that I see myself necessitated through my end, in accordance with laws of freedom, to accept as possible a highest good in the world, but I cannot necessitate anyone else through grounds (the belief is free). ("Jäsche, " 9:69n) In my introductory remarks, I observed that Kant's emphasis on the need for a voluntary dimension in the case of belief in God can look rather "post-Christian" and deflationary, suggesting that such belief is a mere heuristic believing "as if" there is a God. By reading Kant in the context of scholastic accounts of faith, mediated to him through early modern sources, we have gained a new perspective: when Kant invokes a voluntary dimension to faith, whereby one chooses to believe something, this does not, in itself, denigrate the degree to which he is committed to the truth of what is believed in. Rather, it suggests a traditional notion of faith, whereby there is a positive and immediate role for free choice. This is a significant finding, in that it opens up a subtle epistemic texture, which has been to some degree neglected in the recent literature on epistemology, and, also, by Kant commentators.
73 In the recent literature on epistemology, a direct and positive involvement of the will in an assent tends to be regarded as denigrating the degree of commitment to the truth of the assent, in contrast, say, with its regulative "usefulness."
74 Different terms of art are used, but we tend to find a distinction between 'believing-to-be-true' or 'holding true,' and a less committed category of 'acceptance-as-true' or 'holding-as-true,' where we adopt an attitude of acting 'as if' something is the case, without really being committed to this as a truth-claim. So, for example, if I am a diligent store worker, I might accept, as a guide to action, that "the customer is always right," although I will not, if I am rational, believe this: customers might lie, be mistaken, have unreasonable expectations, and violate or neglect the terms of a warranty. Typically, where there is a direct and positive role for the "will," it is assumed that we can only be dealing with "acceptance-as-true" or "holding as true" (which would correspond to Kant's category of merely pragmatic belief), rather than "belief-in-truth" or "holding true." This is not an unreasonable assumption. It is fairly intuitive to regard the actual state of believing something as involuntary, even if the process of investigating beliefs involves a voluntary dimension. When we really believe something to be true, rather than being useful, the intuition is that there is something non-negotiable about the assent; where there is a degree of choice involved, we seem to be in the realm of heuristic fictions. It is precisely because these are intuitive associations that engaging in the history of philosophy can be rewarding on this point. In the scholastic account of faith, we find that a strong role for the will, acting in freedom, is in no way an indication that an assent is a merely regulative as if acceptance, rather than being a belief in the truth of the matter.
73
Chignell, in "Belief in Kant," working from some of the assumptions in recent epistemology discussed here, tends to align voluntariness with a lack of commitment to the truth of what is "heldto-be-true." Jamie Ferreira argues that Kant only defends the belief that God's existence is really possible, and not the belief that God exists ("Hope, Virtue, and the Postulate of God"). A central strand of evidence for Ferreira (although not the only strand) is the way in which Kant employs voluntary notions (such as "subjectively necessary" belief) in his discussion of moral faith. If I am correct, when Kant talks about a voluntary dimension to moral faith, he is within a mainstream tradition of talking about faith, which has live tendrils in Kant's own demonstrable sources.
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For approaches that are representative of this tendency, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Avishai Margalit, "Holding True and Holding as True"; and William Alston, "The deontological conception of epistemic justification." Significantly, where a voluntary dimension to belief is defended, it tends to be in the context of discussing religious commitment. See Mourad, "Choosing to Believe."
75
Palmquist insightfully draws out links between Überzeugung ("conviction") in moral contexts, and, therefore, in the context of "faith" (Glaube), and Kant's discussion of religious Gesinnung, standardly t h e m e d i e va l h e r i ta g e i n k a n t ' s m o r a l fa i t h To this extent, then, something that seems deflationary in Kant turns out to be traditional. In my introductory remarks, I also promised that an aspect of Kant's thought that seems traditional, namely, his association of faith and moral conversion will turn out to be revolutionary. It is to this that I now turn.
4 . t r a d i t i o n a n d t h e k a n t i a n t u r n Both Aquinas and Kant regard faith as certain, even though the degree of "evidence" that we have for faith does not compel the assent of the will, but, rather, the will must choose to assent. For Kant, this certainty arises from the demands of morality. For Aquinas, there is a distinct and different source for this knowledgelike certainty:
Just as science is certain, so also is faith-indeed much more so, because science relies for its certainty on human reason, which can be deceived, while faith relies for its certainty on divine reason, which cannot be contradicted. (In Iob, 4:42, no.662) 
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For Aquinas, at an ultimate level of explanation, faith is something that God achieves in the believer, as a participation in God's own self-knowledge: "this fact that he loves God is the result in the human being of sanctifying grace" (Summa contra gentiles, 3.2, ch.151.2). Faith is a "certain participation in . . . and assimilation to God's own knowledge, in that by the faith infused in us we cling to the first truth for its own sake" (Sup. Boet. De Trin., 2.2c).
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For Aquinas, human freedom is threatened when the will is moved in a way that takes the creature away from God. When, earlier on, I set out the initial similarity between Kant and Aquinas, insofar as they both describe faith as involving a movement of the will, I quoted from Aquinas's De veritate that the will "totally adheres" to faith, albeit that the intellect is not similarly moved (De veritate, 14.1). Also in Aquinas's discussion at this point is a commitment that Kant would certainly avoid:
For just taken by itself, the intellect is not satisfied and it is not terminated in one part; rather, it is terminated only from the outside. And this is why the intellect of one who believes is said to be captivated. For it is being held fast by something else's terminus and not by its own proper terminus (2 Cor 10:5, "bringing the intellect into captivity"). (De veritate, 14.1) For Aquinas, the intellect is not "satisfied" by faith, but it is "captivated." Such "captivation," "from the outside," would be anathema for Kant. Strikingly, for Kant, the only thing that parallels such "captivation" is the submission that the moral law itself requires: translated as "disposition" or "attitude" (see, e.g. Rel., 6:51). Palmquist demonstrates that religious Gesinnung, for Kant, describes a free and resolute act of the will, akin to "conviction" (Überzeugung), rather than a feeling, psychological tendency, or metaphysical event: see "What is Kantian Gesinnung?" Kant's references to the need for "firm resolve" (feste Vorsatz) further emphasize the centrality of volition in moral and religious matters (see Rel., 6:24n; 47; 49n).
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For this reference, and the translation, I am indebted to Marshall, "Aquinas on the Nature of Theology," 33n82. Citation for this work is given according to chapter, verse, and paragraph in the Leonine edition, vol. 26. 77 For this reference, I am indebted to Marshall, "Aquinas on the Nature of Theology," 14.
Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuating but requires submission [Unterwerfung] . (CPrR 5:86) This "submission," though, is, as Kant goes on immediately to explain, not offered to an "external" reality. Addressing "duty," Kant goes on to ask, "what origin is there worthy of you?" (CPrR 5:86). He replies that "every person's own will," even when "directed to himself," is "restricted" to no other condition, except "agreement with the autonomy of the rational being" (CPrR 5:87). Consequently, no "rational being" is "subjected to any purpose that is not possible in accordance with a law that could arise from the will of the affected subject himself" (CPrR 5:87). As rational beings we are bound only to "the sublimity of our nature (in its vocation)" (CPrR 5:87).
In associating human freedom with faith, Kant is aligned with the medieval tradition and his sources.
78 What human freedom is, though, for Kant, and for the medieval tradition, is widely divergent. For the medieval tradition, supernatural divine action in no way violates meaningful human freedom. Indeed, insofar as it brings us closer to God, such supernatural action constitutes freedom. Not so for Kant, who finds that the "faith which our reason can develop out of itself" must arise from human freedom, and from human freedom alone, without God's inner transformation of our will (CF 7:59) . This radical departure underlies, and explains, Kant's insistence that grace follows rather than precedes free moral conversion. This sets the terms for Kant's positive translation of the categories of grace and divine-human cooperation into notions that are acceptable to the pure religion of reason.
5 . k a n t ' s r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f g r a c e a n d d i v i n e c o o p e r a t i o n
In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant allows a positive role for a divine supplement, or assistance, which comes after the person has, in freedom, set
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In a less pronounced way, this emphasis upon divine action and initiative survives into Kant's potential sources, such as Locke, Leibniz, and Baumgarten. When talking about the "Dominion of Faith," Locke states that these "new Discoveries of Truth" are those things that "God hath revealed" (Essay, IV.xviii.10, 695). In the passage from Leibniz's Theodicy cited above, we see that the "divine faith," which is "more than an opinion," is "kindled in the soul," where the will passively receives a movement from God, whereby there is a "possession of the will and heart, to make us act" with "zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands" (Theodicy, §29, 91). Similarly, Baumgarten, when writing about Glaube in the context of God, speaks of "holy faith" as the "collection of those things that must be believed regarding revelation [Offenbarung]" (Metaphysics, §993), where "revelation" in "the strict sense" makes "known to creatures things that they cannot know at all in a natural way" (Metaphysics, §998). On this point, Locke, Leibniz, and Baumgarten are all echoing a movement of thought we find in the tradition. Faith, in relation to divine matters, is a hearing of what is revealed by God. It is in terms of the scope of faith where Locke strikes a different note from Aquinas, departing also from his own (possible) source, Richard Hooker. For Aquinas, even "belief in God" is an "act of faith," which is "not attributable to non-believers," because "in their belief God's existence does not have the same meaning as it does in faith" (Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae.2.2, ad 3). For Locke, the content of faith is constrained to rather peripheral commitments, such as "that part of the Angels rebelled against GOD" (Essay, IV.xviii.7, 694). Kant goes beyond narrowing the scope of faith, and makes a qualitative shift. For the tradition, God is the source of faith: both of its content (whether the content has central or peripheral significance), and of the movement of the will by which we accept this content. For Kant, faith must arise from our own freedom, without supernatural intervention.
In a further passage, from the Third Parerga of Religion, Kant reflects upon the inability of the human being to "realise the idea of the supreme good inseparably bound up with the pure moral disposition," whether that be "with respect to the happiness which is part of that good or with respect to the union of the human beings necessary to the fulfilment of the end" (Rel., 6:139). Nonetheless, there is "also in him the duty to promote the idea," so that "he finds himself driven to believe in the cooperation or the management of a moral ruler of the world, through which alone this end is possible" (Rel., 6:139). Kant goes onto reflect:
And here there opens up before him the abyss of a mystery regarding what God may do, whether anything at all is to be attributed to him and what this something might be in particular, whereas the only thing that a human being learns from a duty is what he himself must do to become worthy of that fulfilment, of which he has no cognition or at least no possibility of comprehension. (Rel., 6:139).
Here it is clear that the human being must still act out of their own freedom, doing "what he himself must do," to use his "powers freely" (Rel., 6:142-43). God is not envisaged as cooperating directly within the human action, as a supernatural immediate efficient cause. But Kant gestures to the mystery of what God might do alongside our non-concurring and supersensible human action, in order to secure the possibility of the highest good.
Rather than saying that Kant rejects, or denies, grace and divine cooperation in the context of moral conversion and its accompanying faith, it is more illuminating to say that he offers reinterpretations of the traditional scholastic supernatural accounts, setting out something that is theologically substantial, but which nonetheless respects supersensible human freedom, as Kant understands it. 
